Yesterday I spent the better part of an hour with Joanne Laucius, a reporter at the Ottawa Citizen. Ms. Laucius phoned to interview me about the public health authorities’ messaging surrounding the H1N1 issue, particularly as it relates to vaccination and the “crisis in the clinics”. The conversation began with her providing a 3-5 minute description about how she wanted to frame her piece. It went something like this:
Public officials are telling us too all get vaccinated one day, then just priority groups the next, followed by letters home to parents advising that everyone be vaccinated, followed by announcements that the vaccine supplies are dwindling, followed by more announcements that there will be plenty available for all … by Christmas. Amidst all this confused messaging it’s no wonder people are panicking and flooding the vaccine clinics. What mistakes were made and how could we learn from them in the future?
The headline of the story that appears in today’s paper is: “Deaths trigger lineups, scrambling, fear: Before vaccine became available, apathy ruled roost.” You can link to it here.
My response, fragments of which are recounted in her story, was as follows:
1. I wanted to comment on the Ipsos Reid poll, released on October 22nd and widely reported on October 23rd, which suggested that public health officials were failing to get the message out about the importance of vaccination. While I understand the impulse to survey citizens about their intentions during a health emergency, it is dangerous for health officials to develop their messaging and operational plans on the basis of such data alone. Public behaviour is subject to dramatic shifts in a crisis situation because the situation on the ground is constantly evolving. When we are dealing with life-and-death circumstances, communication based on polling data can be especially problematic. This doesn’t mean polling data are not useful, only that they are very limiting in their utility. It also doesn’t mean that this is what health officials actually did (although it appears to be the case). But when media report on these numbers in order to place blame at the feet of health officials, we need to put the meaning of those data into context.
2. If we do place our faith in the polling data and conclude that a majority of Canadians were not intending to get vaccinated, this would confirm what risk communication scholars already know: the biggest threat in a time of public health crisis is not widespread panic but apathy. Very rarely do people panic in crisis situations. They may over-prepare but they do not lose self-control and behave unpredictably. I referred to the example of the anthrax attacks in the U.S. in 2001, when people began to stockpile antibiotics to protect themselves from infection: this may have been unnecessary but it was hardly a sign of panic. This surprised the reporter so I was pleased to see this message about apathy in her story.
What are the implications from a practitioner’s perspective? I argued that the major task facing health communicators who confront an apathetic public is to amplify risk messaging – sometimes this means it is necessary to arouse fear about the consequences of inaction. Fear arousal is a delicate task and one that is often done poorly. Following the reports about the polling numbers, I observed far more direct and assertive messaging from health officials last week, particularly the head of the Public Health Agency of Canada, Dr. David Butler-Jones, and Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq. I did not witness fear-mongering on their part. It’s my assessment that the messaging was consistent with the recommendations of risk communication experts. In other words, the public health authorities were doing a reasonably good job in amplifying the risks of indifference.
3. The problem (getting back to the “shifting ground in a crisis” argument) is that the deaths of the two Ontario adolescents last weekend over-amplified those risk messages, creating operational challenges for public health officials in delivering the vaccine (long lineups, people not on priority lists showing up, people asking too many questions instead of just rolling up their sleeve, etc.). This was the point I was making about the “side effects of successful risk communication” (an argument that draws from the theory of reflexivity). At no point have I seen public health officials use these deaths as a rhetorical weapon to whip the public into a state of constant fear. That the risk amplification efforts of health officials coincided with these deaths may have had the unanticipated consequence of making official announcements appear to be more dire than I believe was intended.
4. The report also attributes to me an argument about the distinction between emotional and rational behaviour.
“When you’re dealing with health, people react more to emotion triggers than rational ones. Only when you can see and feel the problem are you motivated,” [Greenberg] said. “It’s not possible to motivate people through biostatistics.”
I did not argue that people either behave emotionally or they behave rationally. What I did say is that during health crises people respond more to emotion-based messages than technical or scientific ones. People responded strongly to the news about the deaths of the 13 and 10 year old children because they could symbolically insert themselves into that situation. Those children could have been our own; they could have been a niece or nephew, the child of a friend or neighbour.
Although the probability of death among non-high risk individuals remains low, the emotional connections we have to children overcomes any impulse we might otherwise have about acting on the basis of statistical calculations about harm. Does this mean people behaved irrationally by flooding the clinics? No, it doesn’t. It might mean they acted on the basis of mistaken beliefs or that their emotional response was inappropriate. Irrational behaviour occurs when our actions consistently lead to a deterioration in our resources or prevent us from learning and improving how we respond to situations. There is no evidence of irrational action here, just as there is no evidence of panic. References to an irrational and panicky public tell us more about what officials and the media believe about human behaviour than it does about how humans actually behave.
5. We also discussed how the public health authorities in Canada have been using (ineffectively) social media, the role that news organizations like the Ottawa Citizen have played in shaping the discourse of “health crisis” throughout this protracted ‘event’, and what lessons regarding communication appear to be emerging from other jurisdictions that, when the time is right, we will all want to assess. Of course, all of this was too much for a single news piece, but my hope is that there will be more coverage about the communications around this issue to come.


